Because, as has often been noted here, I enjoy reading the early explanatory writings of the Nation’s Founders—notably The Federalist Papers and the Constitution—I tend to forget that my pleasure of ancient parchment perusal is not widely shared. During, and in the aftermath of, the 2016 election campaign, that observation was reinforced: neither The Federalist Papers nor the Constitution played much of a role in the minds and speeches of many of the candidates, and certainly no role at all in the vacuous mind and unintelligible speech and tweets of the tenuously-elected president.
When I began writing this particular column, I intended to discuss the placement order of the Constitution’s Articles, focusing on the first three, the underpinning explanations of the principal branches of the federal government: the Legislative (Article I, with 10 Sections); the Executive (Article II, with 4 Sections); and the Judicial (Article III, with 3 Sections). I was going to point out that the order in which these three branches was presented was not a whim of haphazard numbering.
Read again the Preamble:
“We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.”Note the Preamble does not begin with, “I the President…” It begins with “We, the People.” The Constitution’s drafters had a very clear vision of the order of a federal government, a government first and foremost constituted by, of, and for “We the people.” Without the informed debate and consent of the people—the citizens—as vested in a representative legislature, the fear of the emergence of a king or tyrant such as the one the colonies rejected by force during the Revolution, was still very real in the minds of the Founders.
Those fears would be realized in 1812, twenty-five years after the draft Constitution was submitted to George Washington (see transmittal letter below), when the British tried one more time to retake their lost ground. I suggest we should remain alert, if not fearful, given the current president’s base proclivities and unabashed tendencies to embrace counter-freedom strongmen. But I digress.
It is only after Article I and its 10 Sections laying out the responsibilities and powers of the Legislature that the Congress turned to Article II (and its 4 Sections), the powers and responsibilities of the Executive. Article I over-arches Article II in its scope of authority as the elected voice of the people. Yes, the president, also elected by the people (in theory, if not practice), can exercise a fairly broad range of authority. But, with few exceptions (Section 2, the power to pardon, comes to mind, but even that is limited to federal, not state, crimes and does not cover impeachment) nothing the president undertakes under Article II is unequivocally, immutably, unilateral; ultimately, all presidential power can be checked by a determined Congress under Article I, and by the Judiciary under Article III.
My goal was to use the unbreakable two-by-four of the Constitution’s enumerated order of the Articles to smack both the elephants and donkeys trumpeting and braying on Capitol Hill (perhaps “trumpeting” is too easy a pun) firmly across their foreheads to remind them that they are not subservient to the president, nor are they his co-equals. They are, by the obvious placement in the Constitution’s order of presentation, and in the expanse of their powers, superior to the executive in many fundamental ways. And they need to start acting like it.
Anyway, that was the initial direction of today’s blog post. But, as usual, I became sidetracked in the research process. I was happily, willingly, hijacked once again by the wisdom of the Federalists. It is from these 86 Papers (yes, I know they end with Federalist 85, but Federalist 70 is split into two parts) that I draw my deep affection for the enabling language of our democracy, and to which I go frequently to regain my perspective as a citizen.
As I searched for confirmation of my own semi-educated bias that the Congress is Constitutionally-licensed with greater authority than that which is granted to the president, I reread the Federalist Paper that deals with the overall form of our government, and what the Founders may have had in mind for the dynamics behind popular representation. In this particular Paper, I re-discovered the author’s vision of a constantly-refreshed voice of the people and a stable executive whose steady hand guides the ship of state.
Energy and Stability/the Legislative and the Executive
James Madison, in Federalist 37, on the issue of devising a form of government, wrote,
It is only after Article I and its 10 Sections laying out the responsibilities and powers of the Legislature that the Congress turned to Article II (and its 4 Sections), the powers and responsibilities of the Executive. Article I over-arches Article II in its scope of authority as the elected voice of the people. Yes, the president, also elected by the people (in theory, if not practice), can exercise a fairly broad range of authority. But, with few exceptions (Section 2, the power to pardon, comes to mind, but even that is limited to federal, not state, crimes and does not cover impeachment) nothing the president undertakes under Article II is unequivocally, immutably, unilateral; ultimately, all presidential power can be checked by a determined Congress under Article I, and by the Judiciary under Article III.
My goal was to use the unbreakable two-by-four of the Constitution’s enumerated order of the Articles to smack both the elephants and donkeys trumpeting and braying on Capitol Hill (perhaps “trumpeting” is too easy a pun) firmly across their foreheads to remind them that they are not subservient to the president, nor are they his co-equals. They are, by the obvious placement in the Constitution’s order of presentation, and in the expanse of their powers, superior to the executive in many fundamental ways. And they need to start acting like it.
Anyway, that was the initial direction of today’s blog post. But, as usual, I became sidetracked in the research process. I was happily, willingly, hijacked once again by the wisdom of the Federalists. It is from these 86 Papers (yes, I know they end with Federalist 85, but Federalist 70 is split into two parts) that I draw my deep affection for the enabling language of our democracy, and to which I go frequently to regain my perspective as a citizen.
As I searched for confirmation of my own semi-educated bias that the Congress is Constitutionally-licensed with greater authority than that which is granted to the president, I reread the Federalist Paper that deals with the overall form of our government, and what the Founders may have had in mind for the dynamics behind popular representation. In this particular Paper, I re-discovered the author’s vision of a constantly-refreshed voice of the people and a stable executive whose steady hand guides the ship of state.
Energy and Stability/the Legislative and the Executive
James Madison, in Federalist 37, on the issue of devising a form of government, wrote,
“Energy in government is essential to that security against external and internal danger, and to that prompt and salutary execution of the laws which enter into the very definition of good government. Stability in government is essential to national character and to the advantages annexed to it, as well as to that repose and confidence in the minds of the people, which are among the chief blessings of civil society.”A few paragraphs later, Madison writes,
“The genius of republican liberty seems to demand on one side, not only that all power should be derived from the people, but that those intrusted [sic] with it should be kept in independence on the people, by a short duration of their appointments; and that even during this short period the trust should be placed not in a few, but a number of hands. Stability, on the contrary, requires that the hands in which power is lodged should continue for a length of time the same. A frequent change of men will result from a frequent return of elections; and a frequent change of measures from a frequent change of men: whilst energy in government requires not only a certain duration of power, but the execution of it by a single hand.”Here, Madison is describing the practical and group-psychological (social trust) importance of a constantly-refreshed (energetic) legislature coupled with a long-term executor of the legislature’s laws—that is, a stable chief executive. [It is important to bear in mind that there were no presidential term limits at the time the Constitution was ratified. The 22nd Amendment (ratified in 1951) limiting the president to two four-year terms was still a long way off in 1787.]
What Madison is getting at is good government—a government the people can trust to enact socially-just and practically-relevant laws based on the will of the people—needs the energy of a constantly-refreshed legislature that can, in turn, rely on a stable executor of the laws enacted by that legislature.
It is the duty of Congress, consisting of representatives who, on a regular basis, bring new ideas and fresh problem-solving skills to examine constantly the state of the union and the needs of the people locally and nationally, and enact laws to the benefit of the nation as a whole. Such a Congress should be able to rely on a steady hand at the wheel of the Executive who will guide those laws through the machinery of the departments and agencies under his or her leadership.
Let me repeat Madison’s words: “Stability in government is essential to national character and to the advantages annexed to it, as well as to that repose and confidence in the minds of the people, which are among the chief blessings of civil society.”
The energy of an informed and frequently-refreshed legislature, and the stable, reliable, credible, and oath-affirmed actions of a chief executive—neither of which are present today in the nation’s most pressing time of need—are crucial to America’s civil, social, and economic health, strength, and success. In short, the future of our national character, our credibility abroad, and our ethical reliability, is jeopardized by the ineffectual and polarizing actions of a stultified, craven Congress and an intellectually-crippled, fear-mongering president.
I leave you today with Congress’s letter of transmittal of the Constitution to President Washington. Please read it carefully, and note especially the tone of reasonableness, the acknowledgment of imperfection, the hope for compromise, the examination of individual rights in conflict with national needs, and the future-forward flexibility the authors sought to imbue in the operation of representative government.
Consider with an open mind and a clear eye on current events this passage written more than two centuries ago: “In all our deliberations on this subject, we kept steadily in our view that which appears to us the greatest interest of every true American, the consolidation of our Union, in which is involved our prosperity, felicity, safety—perhaps our national existence.”
Let me repeat Madison’s words: “Stability in government is essential to national character and to the advantages annexed to it, as well as to that repose and confidence in the minds of the people, which are among the chief blessings of civil society.”
The energy of an informed and frequently-refreshed legislature, and the stable, reliable, credible, and oath-affirmed actions of a chief executive—neither of which are present today in the nation’s most pressing time of need—are crucial to America’s civil, social, and economic health, strength, and success. In short, the future of our national character, our credibility abroad, and our ethical reliability, is jeopardized by the ineffectual and polarizing actions of a stultified, craven Congress and an intellectually-crippled, fear-mongering president.
I leave you today with Congress’s letter of transmittal of the Constitution to President Washington. Please read it carefully, and note especially the tone of reasonableness, the acknowledgment of imperfection, the hope for compromise, the examination of individual rights in conflict with national needs, and the future-forward flexibility the authors sought to imbue in the operation of representative government.
Consider with an open mind and a clear eye on current events this passage written more than two centuries ago: “In all our deliberations on this subject, we kept steadily in our view that which appears to us the greatest interest of every true American, the consolidation of our Union, in which is involved our prosperity, felicity, safety—perhaps our national existence.”
SIR:
We have now the honor to submit to the consideration of the United States in Congress assembled, that Constitution which has appeared to us the most advisable.
The friends of our country have long seen and desired that the power of making war, peace, and treaties, that of levying money, and regulating commerce, and the correspondent executive and judicial authorities, should be fully and effectually vested in the General Government of the Union; but the impropriety of delegating such extensive trust to one body of men is evident: hence results the necessity of a different organization.
It is obviously impracticable in the Federal Government of these States to secure all rights of independent sovereignty to each, and yet provide for the interest and safety of all. Individuals entering into society must give up a share of liberty to preserve the rest. The magnitude of the sacrifice must depend as well on situation and circumstance, as on the object to be obtained. It is at all times difficult to draw with precision the line between those rights which must be surrendered, and those which may be preserved; and, on the present occasion, this difficulty was increased by a difference among the several States as to their situation, extent, habits, and particular interests.
In all our deliberations on this subject, we kept steadily in our view that which appears to us the greatest interest of every true American, the consolidation of our Union, in which is involved our prosperity, felicity, safety—perhaps our national existence. This important consideration, seriously and deeply impressed on our minds, led each State in the Convention to be less rigid on points of inferior magnitude than might have been otherwise expected; and thus, the Constitution which we now present is the result of a spirit of amity, and of that mutual deference and concession, which the peculiarity of our political situation rendered indispensable.
That it will meet the full and entire approbation of every State is not, perhaps, to be expected; but each will, doubtless, consider, that had her interest alone been consulted, the consequences might have been particularly disagreeable or injurious to others; that it is liable to as few exceptions as could reasonably have been expected, we hope and believe; that it may promote the lasting welfare of that Country so dear to us all, and secure her freedom and happiness, is our most ardent wish.
No comments:
Post a Comment